

базується, як реалізуються сучасні тенденції розвитку «кіберфізичних систем», які з'єднують машини, комп'ютери та людей. Оцінка можливостей створення нових робочих місць шляхом цифровізації носить суперечливий характер. Проте, очевидно, що з'являться значні можливості в інноваційних ІТ-сервісах, які вимагають високого рівня цифрових навичок, кластери навколо таких послуг уже виникають у багатьох країнах. Це означає, що цифрові технології будуть включені у проекти, пов'язані з охороною здоров'я, освітою, сільським господарством, продовольчою безпекою, базовою інфраструктурою, водопостачанням і санітарією, управлінням, соціальним захистом, фінансовими послугами тощо. Цифровізація змінює економіку країн, проте конкретний обсяг і масштаб цих змін ще належить з'ясувати, так як на них впливатимуть як технологічний розвиток, так і політичне регулювання.

Ключові слова: інформація, управління інформацією, ІКТ, інформаційне суспільство, Четверта промислова революція.

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COLLABORATIONISM IN THE UKRAINIAN DIMENSION: EVOLUTION OF UKRAINIAN STATEHOOD

Abstract. The Russian-Ukrainian war has brought renewed attention to the modern interpretation of terminology associated with military conflict. One such term is "collaborator" and "collaboration." Their appearance is linked to the course of the Second World War, but in modern times, they have acquired specific features. The hybrid nature of the military-political activities of the Russian Federation in Ukraine has led to a deformation of the meanings of established concepts and terms. Presenting its aggressive policy as an internal conflict, Russia initially prevented the legal classification of collaboration as a violation of the law.

The article discusses the motivational component of the population in certain regions of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in supporting actions related to the occupation of these territories. The formation of privilege in these regions during Soviet times led to a distorted system of values and orientations in the population of the region. Representatives of the regional industrial-state oligarchy tried to preserve this mental worldview in the evolution of the economy from a state to a market economy. It is characteristic that political forces channeled this regional mental specificity into electoral bonuses for themselves on the way to elections to government bodies. By acting as a passive manipulative component of the population, the region gradually adapted to aggressively protest against existing formats of state power.

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Another basis for active collaboration was the economic component. Against the backdrop of the rapidly enriching regional elite, the main mass of the population was in a difficult economic situation. Worsening demographic and economic indicators in the region became a typical phenomenon. The socio-economic and demographic imbalance led to the emergence of constant social discontent among the population.

Active anti-state activities of the local elite against the background of the inaction of state authorities have created a phenomenon of conditional impunity. The intensification of Russia's involvement in the conflict led to more active actions. The activities in support of Russia by the Ukrainian population of the occupied territories, as aggressor countries, for a long time (2014-2022) did not receive proper qualification. The position of countries, leaders of the world political community, internal political disputes, the massiveness of examples of collaborationist activity, etc., was successful.

The situation changed radically after February 24, 2024. The open disregard for international law, the conduct of military operations with numerous casualties and infrastructure destruction by the Russian Federation, the consolidation of the international community in a coalition supporting Ukraine, and a clear state course to restore territorial integrity and sovereignty led to a more radical and consistent classification of collaborationist activities. With the formation of a national idea and unprecedented consolidation of Ukrainian society, activities that do not fit into this concept have become clearly defined. State institutions, together with society, began to demonstrate intolerance towards manifestations of encroachment on national security and territorial integrity. The evolution of legal classification, effectiveness, and inevitability of punishment for crimes against state security, indicate the completion of the stage of the process of Ukrainian state-building. We are faced with a Ukrainian state with clearly defined national priorities, a formed state identity, national interests, and the ability to protect them.

Keywords: *Soviet mentality, USSR, Ukraine-Russia war, collaborator, collaborationist activity.*

Introduction. The challenges to state security faced by Ukraine have no equivalents in modern international practice, in terms of both content and practice. The events of 2014 demonstrated the direct interdependence of the concept of state security with the implementation and enforcement of justice, control of the information and communication space, and the mental-ideological content of the population's worldview. They became a diagnostic test for the foundations of modern Ukrainian statehood. The wave of various types of collaborationism has highlighted the problematic issues of a wide range of existing concepts in the system of organization of all branches of state power. Understanding the functional nature of this phenomenon requires us to analyze its deformations. Defining the mechanisms of the emergence and implementation of collaborations in conditions of open democratic systems can lead to the development of mechanisms to counter these challenges by the state and representatives of civil society.

The non-standard nature of our research subject directs us towards finding the uniqueness of the method of studying the phenomenon. The nature of modern collaborationism lies not only in the socio-political sphere but also in the deep mental context. This context, in our view, is relevant to consider from the historical, political, and socio-economic perspectives. We propose to present the issue in accordance with the analysis of the human and state factors. With regard to the human dimension, we have the task of analyzing its socio-economic status and mental-historical expectations from the actions of the state power. Defining the state factor, we investigate the mechanisms of implementation/non-implementation, activity/inactivity of the exercise of state power. The existence of a historical factor is indicated by the mental proximity

of the population to the Soviet legacy and the absence of effective constructs for its transformation.

Our research examines the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions during the period from 2014-2023. The chosen region and timeframe provide a comprehensive presentation of the spread of collaborationist activity in both the human and state-legal dimensions.

Analysis of recent research and publication. The authors of the Oxford Dictionary present a collaborator as "a person who helps the enemy in a war, when they have taken control of the person's country" (Oxford learners dictionaries, 2023). The Encyclopedia of the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine interprets collaborationism as voluntary cooperation with the occupying authorities. It has various types, such as domestic, administrative, economic, military, political, and military-political (Dereyko, n.d.). The Great Soviet Encyclopedia defines collaborationists as people who collaborated with the Nazis during World War II (Great Soviet Encyclopedia, n.d.). Thus, by comparing the chronological and terminological concepts, we can conclude that in a broad context, there is a common substantive interpretation. Collaborationism is an activity aimed at supporting the establishment, maintenance, and functioning of institutions in a country that has annexed the territory of another state. A collaborator is a person who, through their actions or inaction, contributes to the establishment, maintenance, and functioning of institutions in a country that has annexed the territory of another state.

Collaborationism is not a invention of modern times, it has received its interpretation and wide coverage with socio-scientific discussion during and after the Second World War. Researchers of this issue have a wide geography, but not united by a common understanding of this phenomenon. Domestic scientists began to actively study this issue starting from the restoration of Ukrainian statehood. In his works, Yaroslav Hrytsak presents collaborationism as cooperation of the population with the occupation regime. Considering the events of the Second World War, he emphasizes the forced nature of collaborationism associated with physiological survival. Presenting its manifestations on the territory of Ukraine, especially in Galicia, as those that did not have a meaningful basis. The population of the region did not recognize the political and legal jurisdiction of the USSR on its territory, considering it as a result of temporary military occupation, which leads to conditional interpretation of their activities as collaborators (Hrytsak, 1996). A similar point of view, considering the events of World War II, is held by another domestic researcher – I. Patrylyak. His thesis is based on the absence of Ukrainian statehood and the disorientation of society in the conditions of global changes (Patrylyak, 2017). American researcher of the history of the Soviet Union T. Snyder defines the nature of collaborationism on its territory by the presence of mental non-perception of the repressive nature of the totalitarian policy of the state towards its own citizens (Snyder, 2011, p. 28). This position was completely different from the Soviet interpretation of collaboration, which was determined as the implementation of any activity regulated by the Nazis. Even the fact of being in the occupied territory was considered a crime against the state. Responsibility for such actions was borne by every citizen of the USSR who found himself on the occupied territory; it

did not provide for state humanitarian tolerance (Penter, 2005; Shaykan, 2012). Based on the analysis of scientific paradigms, we tend to the absence of a single definition of collaborationism and the existence of different interpretations of this phenomenon in various socio-historical contexts.

The purpose of the article is to research the evolution of Ukrainian statehood.

Formulation of the main material. The functioning of state institutions in Ukraine during the first decade of independence was based on the basic post-Soviet model of governance. This was due to several factors, including the absence of comprehensive programs for reorganizing the state to Western democratic standards, the dominance of individuals or supporters of the Soviet ideological model of governance at various levels of government, and, most importantly, the lack of a formed mental concept of Ukrainian statehood in society.

With the restoration of independence, the socio-economic expectations of a certain part of society were not fulfilled. The market economy of the 1990s led to financial impoverishment of the majority of the country's population. Against this backdrop, former Soviet nomenklatura representatives and openly criminal elements rapidly enriched themselves. They were able to appropriate and monopolize the main part of the economic legacy of the USSR and natural resources of the state. In the conditions of the initial period of capital accumulation, they only in the 2010^s were able to establish financial and economic well-being of the population. The polarization of property in society did not give mental peace to the population of the country, especially in the Donbas region. The idea of social equality, close to the majority since the Soviet times, did not leave the information-political sphere. The high level of incomes of the managerial staff of large private enterprises, highly qualified workers, and gradually self-employment of the population became a preventive measure against social explosions.

The Donetsk and Luhansk regions had one of the most powerful potentials in the country during the pre-war period. Let's try to determine the demographic and socio-economic indicators of the region using statistical data. In the study, we will use official statistical indicators recorded in the reports of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, which do not require additional verification. The statistical calculations presented in the study were made by the author. The chosen chronological periods correspond to profound political shifts in the country: 2005 (the time after the victory in the Orange Revolution), 2008 (in the absence of official statistical indicators for the corresponding period), and 2013 (the year of the greatest economic stability in the pre-war period), (State Statistics Service of Ukraine).

As of December 1, 2005, the number of residents in Donetsk region was 4,627,119 people, of which 4,179,631 (90.3 % of the total population of the region) lived in urban areas and 447,488 lived in rural areas (9.6 % of the total population of the region). As of December 1, 2013, the number of residents in Donetsk region was 4,346,727 people, of which 3,940,110 (90.6 % of the total population of the region) lived in urban areas and 406,617 lived in rural areas (9.3 % of the total population of the region). By population size, this was the most populous region in Ukraine. In the Luhansk region, these indicators were as follows: as of December 1, 2005, the number of residents was 2,411,747

people, of which 2,083,209 (86.3 % of the total population of the region) lived in urban areas and 328,538 lived in rural areas (13.6 % of the total population of the region). As of December 1, 2013, the number of residents in the Luhansk region was 2,240,786 people, of which 1,946,316 (86.8 % of the total population of the region) lived in urban areas and 294,470 lived in rural areas (13.1 % of the total population of the region).

Analyzing the natural population movement over the same period in Donetsk region for 2005, it was -47,780 with 412 deaths of infants under 1 year old. In 2013, the situation was as follows: natural increase was -28,311 with 467 deaths of infants under 1 year old. In 2005, the increase in Luhansk region was -26,498 with 210 deaths of infants under 1 year old, while in 2013, the natural increase was -15,291 with 152 deaths of infants under 1 year old. In 2013, these regions demonstrated the worst demographic indicators and were among the five regions of Ukraine with negative demographic indicators, just like in 2005.

The level of economic activity of the population in Donetsk region in 2013 for ages 15-70 was 65.4 % (of the total population of the corresponding age), of which the working-age population was 75.7 %. The corresponding indicators in Luhansk region were 63.3 % and 71.2 %. The high indicators of activity actually had an average result among other regions of the country: Donetsk region ranked 8th and Luhansk region ranked 15th. Comparing these indicators with similar ones in 2008, we can state the stability of positions. In 2013, the employed population (based on a selective survey on economic activity) was considered to be 1,968.1 thousand people in Donetsk region and 1,104.7 thousand people in Luhansk region. In 2005, the employed population by types of economic activity was as follows: industry – Donetsk region – 667.7 thousand people (31.42 % of the total employed population), Luhansk region – 307.9 thousand people (29.2 % of the total employed population). These indicators placed the regions in the top three leaders in the country. In construction: Donetsk region – 122.5 thousand people, Luhansk region – 51.6 thousand people. In this position, Donetsk region took first place, and Luhansk region was among the top five. In 2013, the industrial sector employed 496.4 thousand people (25.2 % of the total employed population, but 25.6 % less than the previous indicators) in Donetsk region, and 240.7 thousand people (21.8 % of the total employed population) in Luhansk region.

The average monthly salary in 2005 (January-December) was 961.61 UAH in Donetsk region and 804.85 UAH in Luhansk region. These were the second and fifth positions in the ranking of regions in the country. In 2013, this situation remained unchanged. The average monthly salary (January-December) in Donetsk region was 23,755 UAH, and in Luhansk region it was 3,337 UAH. This allowed them to maintain their positive positions in the national ranking (second and fourth places, respectively). At the same time, there was a constant backlog in the payment of wages: in 2006, as of January 1, this figure was 227.7 million UAH in Donetsk region and 84.8 million UAH in Luhansk region; in 2014, it was 115.4 million UAH and 44.2 million UAH, respectively. Analyzing statistical data as of January 1, 2014 (actually for 2013), it should be noted that the level of wage arrears in Donetsk region was several times higher than the corresponding indicators in the regions of Ukraine. Thus, the relevant indicators by regions in millions of UAH were as

follows: Dnipropetrovsk region – 7, Zaporizhzhia – 41, Kyiv city – 36.9, Mykolaiv region – 45.7.

The regional gross product in terms of US dollars (based on the NBU exchange rate as of the end of December of the current year and without taking into account inflation) was 15,278,701.2 US dollars in Donetsk region in 2008 and 20,876,708.8 US dollars in 2013. With the unemployment rate in Donetsk region at 8.4 % (among the working-age population) in 2013 and 6 % in 2008. Luhansk region had a regional gross product in terms of US dollars (based on the NBU exchange rate as of the end of December of the current year and without taking into account inflation) of 5,582,467.5 US dollars in 2008 and 6,975,696.2 US dollars in 2013. With the unemployment rate in Luhansk region at 6.7 % (among the working-age population) in 2013 and 7 % in 2008. A comparative analysis of the relationship between the unemployment rate and regional gross domestic product (GDP) indicators is a contradiction to widely recognized economic laws. In the region, a situation has arisen in which an increase in regional GDP leads to an increase in unemployment. Factors influencing this phenomenon that are not typical of economic laws, in our opinion, may include a high level of hidden employment and, as a result, sustainable development of shadow economy sectors.

The comparative analysis of statistical indicators leads us to certain conclusions. Despite positive economic achievements, there were growing negative trends. While the total number of people employed was decreasing, the percentage of economically inactive population was increasing. The high level of wages was maintained due to the work of the leading industry in the region – the manufacturing sector. Observing the level of wage arrears, we can conclude that there is a disparity in the economic development of the region. The employment sector was mainly represented by a segment of large private ownership and the public sector. The share of private self-employment among the population was not significant, which hindered the formation of an initiative civil society.

The imbalance of economic indicators created a certain level of social tension in the region, which in turn led to the formation of a specific psycho-emotional state of the population. This situation has intensified fears of the actively employed part of the population about restructuring and standardization in accordance with new European production standards, with partial loss of positive economic indicators. The traditionally economically inactive part of the population was anticipating a decline in their standard of living. All of this was happening against the backdrop of active dissemination of fake information by representatives of local political elites and influential entrepreneurs who acted as amplifiers of public opinion and "guarantors of stability" regarding the negative consequences of such transformations.

The further implementation of economic reforms has become a politically motivated process. The party-clan oligarchy sought to create conditions for lobbying their own economic needs and maintain a dominant position in certain industrial sectors, linking this to the single vector of development for the state and the region. The main idea of the political elites becomes a choice between pro-European and pro-russian economic-informational content. Moreover, local elites in their private activities considered these vectors to be parity. Acting at the regional level as guarantors

of economic stability (employers and taxpayers, patrons), they oriented the political preferences of the local population towards themselves. Attempts by representatives of opposition-oriented power to correct this situation faced crazy social resistance and failed.

The process of the emergence and functioning of the party-clan oligarchy has two tendencies characteristic of the region. Firstly, we can determine the traditional nature of the perception of power and political infantilism of society. In such an industrial region as Donbas, the Soviet authorities formed an international community with a denationalized essence. The factor of national identity was artificially replaced by socio-economic identity. The high concentration of industrial production, urbanization processes, and the exclusive presence of the state sector of the economy led to an indispensable dependence of the economic well-being of the population on the effectiveness of state regulatory policy. Where only the state acted as a guarantor of the stable socio-economic well-being of citizens. The intensity of the production cycle and typical political inertness is a characteristic feature of shaping the worldview of the population of the region during the Soviet period. The period of Ukraine's independence led to economic crises, including bankruptcies of state-owned enterprises, stagnation in the industrial sector, high unemployment, and restructuring of production. As a result of various circumstances, the right to ownership of industrial production acquired monopolistic features, concentrated in a small circle of individuals. They initially became the guarantors of the region's economic stability, but later developed political ambitions. The transformation of state ownership into private ownership occurred in the public consciousness through a simplified procedure, without the conscious participation of the majority of the population. This situation became possible due to the traditional isolation of the population from economic and political processes in society. Taking advantage of the stability of the industrial sector in the region, led by representatives of big business, the population, at a semi-conscious level, began to attribute to it characteristics typical of the Soviet era, while fully or partially distancing themselves from their own active socio-economic and political position.

During the first decade of Ukrainian statehood, there were two stable socio-mental identities in the information field: the Soviet and the state-building identity. The Soviet identity emerged as a result of the state policy of the country until 1991. The leading role of ideology in the life of the state through the educational, household, and official worldview systems made a significant part of the population carriers of such a way of seeing the functioning of the state and the world. Soviet narratives took root in everyday life and demonstrated resistance to hybridization. Physiologically, carriers of such a mental worldview predominated and had an active life phase during the first decade of Ukrainian independence. In contrast, the state-building concept was presented in the early years of independence by a small percentage of the population, positioning itself on a spectrum of interpretation from neutrality to hostility. The lack of comprehensive ideological and educational programs, double standards in historical heritage, and the de facto change of political players have led to its weakening or amorphous existence. The bimentality that was characteristic of the population of Ukraine had clear regional specifics.

Regional political elites played a catalytic role in providing a certain "legitimacy" to these perceptions. Starting from the events of the Orange Revolution (2004), they actively used concepts of regional specificity, pro-russian orientation, openly presenting various formats of regional autonomy and separateness from state institutions. With these actions, they provoked the formation of an artificial identity, not related to historical reality, with separatist tendencies. The plane of influence on the consciousness of the region's population was devoid of state regulation and was formed on the unconscious reaction of the population.

Russian ideological and worldview concepts have increasingly become a geopolitical alternative for the region. Over the past decades, narratives of Soviet heritage and geopolitical mistakes of the past have spread in Russia. A socio-political and economic context was formed under which the existence of the reincarnation of the Soviet Union is a quite relevant phenomenon in modern globalization conditions. This paradigm advocated the idea that the unification of two states is a completely "justified" phenomenon of restoring "historical justice". The mental proximity of part of Ukraine's population to such narratives became a fertile ground for mass collaboration activities and uncritical acceptance of aggression. The model of state collaborationism was considered the only correct model of regional self-identification and a guarantee of economic stability in the region.

Since 2014, events in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions have had a parallel classification. The Russian side presented this as an internal state conflict, while Ukraine considered it as external aggression. The hybridization of Russian actions and locals in the early stages of military aggression solidified the classification of "separatism" for the actions of the local population. This position was intended to remove legal responsibility from both the aggressor country and its supporters in the occupied territories. The legal strategy adopted made it difficult for Ukraine to conduct its own judicial proceedings and temporarily delayed international categorization. Using these circumstances, the Russian side attempted to unilaterally legalize the collaborationist activities of the local population, providing them with state support and recognition.

The presence of ideological positions among the region's population, as well as the support and provocative activities of local political and economic elites, formed an active protest enclave in the region at the beginning of 2014. It should be noted that these events took place against the backdrop of a power transition in the central authorities in Kyiv. The disappearance of President V. Yanukovich and the appointment of O. Turchynov as Acting President following the Revolution of Dignity only exacerbated this situation. Russia's active interference in Ukraine's internal affairs led to an effective policy of removing regional elites from leading positions in the protest movement in the region. Therefore, since the spring of 2014, we can observe Russia's exceptional role in managing certain territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

By the decree of the Acting President of Ukraine, O. Turchynov (No. 405/2014) dated April 13, 2014, in accordance with the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of April 13, 2014 "On Urgent Measures to Overcome the Terrorist Threat and Preserve the Territorial

Integrity of Ukraine" (Decree of the President of Ukraine No. №405/201419), an Anti-Terrorist Operation was declared on the territory of the state. It lasted chronologically from April 14, 2014 to April 30, 2018. After its completion, the President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, signed a Decree on the beginning of the Joint Forces Operation under the leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine "to ensure the protection of the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of our state," thereby implementing the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated April 30, 2018, "On a Large-Scale Anti-Terrorist Operation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions" (Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 116/201818). Legislative regulation of the actions of the state of Ukraine to restore the territorial integrity of the state has a military-political meaning. The use of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in this context is the main result of responding to an external threat. However, our attention will be focused on the legal and legislative activities of the state on the classification and implementation of justice for the collaborationist activities of its citizens.

Using the results of our research, we can assert the formation of a mental stereotype of thinking among residents of certain territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which were occupied as early as 2014. The presence of bivalent identity, which combined them with Soviet standards of life and orientations, the mental non-perception of the latest living conditions in independent Ukraine, as well as the disregard for personal efforts towards internal self-improvement and the need to take personal responsibility for their own lives, turned the main mass of the population into a constantly protesting mass. The lack of "de facto" traditions and practices of defending their rights in a democratic way, the functioning of the Party of Regions as a regional, political hegemon and transmitter of socio-economic aspirations of the population turned the region's population into a manipulative component of lobbying interests of party-oligarchic structures. The deterioration in the progression of economic indicators of life and the unwillingness to seek alternatives were perceived as a pretext for legal social protest. The synchronization of protests in the region with the overall nationwide trend against the background of the Revolution of Dignity. In our opinion, these circumstances led to a massive wave of protests that engulfed settlements in Eastern Ukraine. The political instability in the country and the region was exploited by the Russian Federation, the consequence of which is the occupation of Ukraine's territory.

During these events, Ukrainian society and the legal system collided with mass manifestations of collaborationist activity. Attempts to classify them as separatism clearly fit into the official Russian concept of an "internal" Ukrainian conflict, complicating social debate and judicial practice. The Criminal Code of Ukraine provides for liability for crimes against the foundations of national security of the state (Articles 109-114). The object of the crime is social relations that ensure state security, constitutional order, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability, defense capability. For such activity, significant punishment is provided from five to fifteen years (Criminal Code of Ukraine). The main changes and additions to these articles took place in 2022. The open military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine caused the detailing of actions related to collaborationist activity,

corresponding changes were determined by the President in the Law of Ukraine On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Regarding the Establishment of Criminal Liability for Collaborationist Activity of March 3, 2022, No. 2108-IX (Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Establishing Criminal Liability for Collaborative Activities"). This article increases the legal liability for acts of collaborationism and establishes clear criteria for prosecution.

Despite the existing legal norms, from 2014 to 2022, the judicial practice did not become an effective tool for preventing and punishing collaborationist activities. The wide public discussion and media accusations only partially reflected the fate of collaborators. Analyzing the Unified State Register of Court Decisions, it can be argued that during the period from January 1, 2014, to February 24, 2022, there were only 81 documents containing court judgments on the qualification of state treason (the analysis was carried out within the geographic boundaries of the entire country). Not all the facts in this list were given responsible verdicts. The majority of decisions concerned deputies, military personnel, judges, employees of the Security Service of Ukraine, and other law enforcement agencies throughout Ukraine. The punishment terms mentioned in the cases have a significant character ranging from 3 to 14 years.

Using the same register but correcting the query in the format of criminal cases concerning crimes against national security, there are already 347 judgments by judges. The vast majority of these judgments were conditional. Judges took into account the willingness of the defendants to cooperate and issued verdicts with probationary periods without imprisonment and insignificant terms of imprisonment ranging from 3 to 6 years. In our opinion, such inconsistency was due to low factors. Among the main factors, we can highlight the following: the absence of a consolidated policy of the world countries regarding the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the lack of a national strategy for restoring territorial integrity against the backdrop of massive collaborationist facts, the existing energy dependence of the world countries, especially Europe, on Russian energy resources, the presence of Russian nuclear potential and public statements about its use. These circumstances significantly affected the effectiveness of the application of national law norms.

The situation underwent a fundamental change after February 24, 2022. Russia's overt military aggression, aimed at the complete occupation of Ukrainian territory and a change in its constitutional order, led to the radicalization of all state defense mechanisms. Against the backdrop of a clearly defined state position on sovereignty, a democratic coalition supporting Ukraine was consolidated. Traditional partners as well as those who took an expected position from the start of the conflict became part of this coalition. Russia's gross violation of international law led to the radicalization of actions against it by world countries. Diversification of European energy dependence, extensive military-technical, humanitarian, and socio-economic support for Ukraine, and successes of the Ukrainian Armed Forces made it possible to reclassify Russia from a "permanent enemy" to a "solution to the Russian threat". The number of cases that received verdicts with significant prison terms in the speedy procedural period is increasing. In response to our request through the Unified State Register of Court Decisions in the category "criminal cases:

crimes against the national security of Ukraine," there are already 931 documents, including 293 for the charge of state treason and 365 for collaboration activities.

In January 2023, the fact of the occupation of Ukrainian territory since 2014 was recognized at the international judicial level. The decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. russia (applications Nos. 8019/16, 43804/14, and 28525/20) confirms the de facto existing definition, legally classifying the jurisdiction of the russian federation over temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine (<https://hudoc.echr.coe.int>). Based on this provision, the actions of the local population are automatically classified as collaborationism, not separatism. This fact convincingly proves not only the period of actual occupation of certain territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but also the chronology of russian military aggression against Ukraine as a whole. We can assert that the persecution of collaborators in legal practice and the public information space will intensify and take on specific forms. One such form of persecution and prevention can be physical destruction of collaborators in occupied territories. The activities of Ukrainian citizens in occupied territories, which since 2014 had no clear legal qualification or responsibility, have acquired all the features of collaborationism since February 2022.

Conclusions. In the conditions of a totalitarian society with the absence of the right to freedom, collaborationism was caused by the impossibility of representatives of civil society to effect change (place of residence, political regime in the country, resources of political power). Considering the Ukrainian dimension of collaborationism, we have opposite indicators. Ukrainian citizens had access to democratic instruments of change (elections of local authorities, parliamentarians, president), a long history of legitimacy of the Ukrainian government that was not called into question, and free access to change citizenship and place of residence. Collaborationist activity, which for some time was presented as a regional socio-economic and political specificity, no longer has arguments to interpret as such. The inspiration and interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine, effective management of territories by the russian federation since 2014, recognition of "formats of self-government" and their inclusion in its composition – are the main arguments in favor of classifying the aggressor country as such. And as a result, it requalifies the activities of Ukrainian citizens in support of the aggressor country as collaborationist activity.

The basis of the mass collaboration that took place in certain regions of Ukraine as of the spring of 2014 is becoming history. They had their roots in the Soviet mentality, economic instability, and the absence of a state narrative. With the strengthening of life positions of the generation of the last years of the existence of the Soviet Union and born during the period of independence of Ukraine, the significance of these factors is decreasing.

Legislative regulation and public discussion regarding the terminology and content of collaborative activities in the socio-legal field are significant indicators of the final stage of the formation of Ukrainian statehood and complete distancing from Soviet heritage. Today, not only is there an increase in responsibility for collaborative activities and classification of conflict parties, but also a change in the mental-terminological understanding of the

term "state". Against this background, Soviet social and political practices of civil society functioning and the role of the individual in this process are completely destroyed. Instead, a new mass format of involvement in state-building processes is emerging, where an active civic position corresponds to the standards of building and functioning of a democratic society.

The degree and extent of punishment for each individual citizen of Ukraine for collaborative activities in occupied territories will be determined by the court, but it is already clear that the manipulative component of such classification has significantly narrowed. In Ukrainian society and legal classification, the contours of statehood mentality, which have historical and national roots and completely destroy imperial-soviet narratives, are clearly defined.

Conflict of Interest and other Ethics Statements

The author declares no conflict of interest.

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Артур МАРГУЛОВ

КОЛАБОРАЦІОНІЗМ В УКРАЇНСЬКОМУ ВИМІРІ: ЕВОЛЮЦІЯ УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ДЕРЖАВНОСТІ

Анотація. Російсько-українська війна актуалізувала сучасну інтерпретацію термінологічних понять пов'язаних із військовим конфліктом. Однією із таких одиниць є терміни «колаборант» та «колабораційна діяльність». Їх поява пов'язана із перебігом Другої світової війни, але у сучасних умовах вони набули специфічних рис. Гібридність військово-політичної діяльності російської федерації на території України призвела до деформації змістів усталених понять та термінів. Презентуючи свої агресивну політику як внутрішньодержавний конфлікт, росія на перших етапах унеможливила правову класифікацію колабораційної діяльності як правопорушення.

В статті розглядаються мотиваційна складова населення окремих регіонів Донецької та Луганської областей у підтримці дій пов'язаних із окупацією цих територій. Формування за радянських часів привілейованості зазначеного регіону призвело до викривленої системи цінностей та орієнтацій у населення регіону. Цей ментальний світогляд намагались зберегти представники регіонального промислово-державного алігархату в умовах еволюції економіки з державної до ринкової. Характерним є те, що його також використали з політичної метою. Політичні сили каналізували ментальну регіональну специфіку у електоральні бонуси для себе на шляху до виборів у органи державної влади. Виступаючи пасивною маніпулятивною складовою населення регіону поступово адаптувалось до агресивно-протестного супротиву існуючих форматі державної влади. Іншим підґрунтям активної колабораційної діяльності була економічна складова. На тлі швидко збагачуючої регіональної еліти, основна маса населення перебувала у важкому економічному становищі. Погіршення демографічних та економічних показників у регіоні ставало типовим явищем. Соціально-економічний та демографічний дисбаланс призвів до появи постійно існуючого соціального невдоволення населення.

Активна антидержавна діяльність місцевої еліти на фоні бездіяльності державних органів влади утворили феномен умовної безкарності. Активізація росії як сторони конфлікту призвело до більш активний дій. Діяльність на підтримку дій росії з боку українського населення окупованих територій, як країни агресори, тривалий час (2014-2022 роки) не отримувало належної кваліфікації. Вдалась взнаки позиція країн, лідерів світової політичної спільноти, невизначеність внутрішнього політичного диспуту, масовість прикладів колабораційної діяльності та ін.

Ситуація докорінно змінюється після 24 лютого 2024 року. Відкрите нехтування

норм міжнародного права, ведення воєнних дії із численними жертвами та інфраструктурними руйнаціями із боку РФ, консолідація міжнародної спільноти у коаліційній підтримки України, чіткий державний курс на відновлення територіальної цілісності та суверенітету – призвели до більш радикальної та послідовної класифікації колабораційної діяльності. З формуванням національної ідеї та небаченої до того консолідацією українського суспільства стало чітко вимальовуватись діяльність, яка не входить до цієї концепції. Державні інституції разом із суспільством почали демонструвати відсутність толерантності до проявів посягання на національну безпеку та територіальну цілісність. Еволюція правової класифікації, дієвість та невідворотність покарання фактів скоєння злочинів проти державної безпеки, свідчить про завершення етапу процесу українського державотворення. Перед нами постала українська державність із з чітко визначеними національними пріоритетами, з сформованою державницькою ідентичністю, національними інтересами та можливостями їх захищати.


Ключові слова: *радянська ментальність, СРСР, україно-російська війна, колаборант, колабораційна діяльність.*

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PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECT OF INFORMATION WARFARE

Abstract. The purpose of the article is to determine the philosophical aspect of the current state of information warfare. The set goal determined the solution of the following tasks: 1) to substantiate the expediency of using the terms information warfare and information warfare discourse; 2) to improve the definition of information warfare; 3) to analyse the threats

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