

PHILOSOPHY

UDC 165.12

DOI :10.31733/2786-491X-2021-2-7-17



Pavlo KRETOV[®]
Candidate
of Philosophical Sciences,
Associate Professor
(Cherkasy
Bohdan Khmelnytsky
National University),
Ukraine



Olena KRETOVA[®]
Candidate
of Pedagogical Sciences,
Associate Professor
(Cherkasy
Bohdan Khmelnytsky
National University),
Ukraine

ANTI-CORRELATIONISM CLUSTER AND PERFORMATIVE NARRATIVE

Abstract. The purpose of the study is to elucidate the defining tendencies of anti-correlationism and its narrative strategies as a fundamental basis of speculative realism, and to consider one of its versions, namely, object-oriented ontology in relation to the concept of narrative ontology and the notion of performative as an anthropological marker of discourse from the perspective of understanding the problem of philosophical anthropology. The authors proceed from the paradoxical nature of anti-correlationism guidelines that substantiate nonrelational metaphysics, while postulating the construction of a narrative ontology of reality, which has the characteristics of a performative. For the first time, the anthropological content of defining tendencies of anti-correlationism and its narrative strategies as a fundamental basis of speculative realism and object-oriented ontology are compared with the concept of narrative ontology and the notion of performative as an anthropological marker of discourse. It has been found that the discursive critique of correlationism is internally contradictory, as it appeals to the thinking and consciousness of the subject and the narrative it creates as a picture of the world. Nowadays, the performative functions as a model of language and speech meaning formation that ontologize the reality of human consciousness, experience and thinking.

Keywords: *anti-correlationism, narrative, performative, speculative realism, narrative ontology*

Introduction. The first third of the 21st century in philosophy is determined by the intense search of the alternatives to the latest research programmes that would update philosophical knowledge in the context of powerful socio-cultural dynamics caused by the fourth wave of scientific and technical revolution, rapid development of information and communication technologies, rethinking the

© Kretov P., 2021
ataraksia@ukr.net
ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2593-3731>
ResearcherID: D-4067-2016

© Kretova O., 2021
ekretova@ukr.net
ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3947-4479>
ResearcherID T-3096-2018

efficiency of the dominant social and economic models, and the transformations of life forms and phenomena of human culture. This is especially true of the fundamental foundations of the Western mode of philosophizing and rationality, which in general can be genetically reduced to the projects of science and philosophy of the New Age and the Enlightenment. Especially, it concerns the fundamental foundations of the Western mode of philosophizing and rationality that, in general, can be genetically reduced to the projects of science and philosophy of New Age and Enlightenment. This refers to the ontological, epistemological and aesthetic foundations of the picture of the world of modern human. Moreover, modern critique of the philosophical tradition, in particular by the cluster of speculative realism theories, goes far beyond the poststructuralist or postmodern in the broadest sense of the “rebellion against reason”. The question is no longer a “hermeneutic turn” or an “ontological turn” in philosophy to overcome the counterproductive legacy and specific “disorienting aftertaste” of postmodern projects with their inherent negation and recursiveness, but the problematization of the “Anthropocene” (T. Morton, & B. Doan, 2013, 233 p.), and the formation of ideas about the post-Anthropocene. The speculative turn is to critique the implicit instruction that “reality appears in philosophy only as a correlatetion of human thought” (Bryant, Srnicek, 2011, p. 3). Anti-correlationism, which combines the philosophical constructions of Q. Meillassoux, G. Harman, R. Brassier, I. Grant, et al., implicitly implies the rejection of traditional forms of both representation and reception of reality that returns human and his philosophy to the problem of narrative being not only the form of knowledge existence or thought formalization but also of Wittgenstein’s space of language and the limits of narrative as the limits of the human world. In our opinion, the ambition of the mentioned theories reaches the rethinking of the form content of human thinking, theories of representation and definition (P. Kretov & O. Kretova, 2017). Somehow, the emergence of a cluster of anti-correlationism (here in after, CA) problematizes not only the concept of object, reality and relations between them, but and primarily the classical concept of the subject and its, accepted in cognitive sciences and constructivism, version of the subject as agent, as well as the issue of representation of knowledge in thinking and discourse, and involves the transformation of the traditional relationship of the concepts of “object”, “thing”, “concept”. Anti-correlationism in philosophy paradoxically agrees with the radical versions of the philosophy of information and transhumanism, which problematize, in fact, the concept of human. These considerations determine the relevance of the research topic.

The purpose of the article is to elucidate the defining tendencies of anti-correlationism and its narrative strategies as a fundamental basis of speculative realism, and to consider one of its versions, namely, object-oriented ontology in relation to the concept of narrative ontology and the notion of performative as an anthropological marker of discourse from the point of view of understanding the problems of philosophical anthropology.

Analysis of recent research and publications. P. Sloterdijk (2018), T. Morton (2013), G. Harman (2018, 2020), Q. Meillassoux, (2008), L. Bryant (2011), R. Brassier (2011), J.-L. Moriceau (2017), H. Meretoja (2014), F. Longo, A. Padovano, S. Umbrello (2020), I. Bogost (2012), V. Rudnev (2016), O. Golovashina (2018), O. Agafonova (2006) and other foreign researchers studied the issues related to the research topic. The contribution of N. Zahurska (2017), V. Starovoit (2018), D. Shatalova-Davidova, N. Sholukho, D. Kralechkina, A. Morozov and others should be noted.

Formulation of the main material. Speaking about the cluster of anti-correlationism in modern philosophy, whose representatives, particularly, G. Harman, Q. Meillassoux, R. Brassier, position their views as those belonging to realism paradigm, we should mention that there are different views about the institutionalization or non-institutionalization of speculative realism as a

philosophic current. While G. Harman believes that the very fact of the presence of this terminological word combination in university programs is evidence of the existence, formulation and recognizability of this current, Q. Meillassoux and R. Brassier do not share this view tending to separate the philosophical brand and publicity around it and the self-sufficiency of the current as a serious philosophical movement. It is anti-correlationism as an initial guiding principle of philosophizing that combines speculative realism and to some extent the fundamental ontology of M. Heidegger, the phenomenological project of G. Husserl, analytical philosophy, language philosophy, and, particularly, the theory of narrative and performative judgements. It is actually a performative, a speech that acquires the ontological status of an event, object and thing (object) (P. Kretov, & O. Kretova, 2017). The project of anti-correlationism in the first quarter of the 21st century fills the performative forms of discourse with both explicit and implicitly non-anthropocentric content.

Q. Meillassoux in his report “Time without Becoming” (2008) notes: “We should redefine compliance, find a completely different concept of adequacy, if we really intend to reject correlationism in all its power. Since, as we will see, what we see outside of correlation is very different from naive concepts of things, qualities and attitudes. This reality is significantly different from the reality which is given to us”. The anti-correlationist guideline fills Hegel’s definition of speculative as a type of reasoning in which knowledge is derived without reference to experience, as well as Kant’s distinction of analytical and synthetic judgments with new meaning, since the overriding task of theories belonging to this cluster is to problematize Kant’s concept of the transcendental subject and modern rationality in general. If we consider correlationism, according to Q. Meillassoux, as theories being antagonistic to realism, then philosophical realism involves first the elimination of a subject and the deconstruction of the subject-object dichotomy. Correlationism as a guide covers almost the entire existing typology of philosophical approaches to the problem of the relationship between reality and human consciousness, and finally the traditional fundamental problem of the relationship between being and thinking. Significantly, Q. Meillassoux’s assertion that an opponent of correlationism “would be a model of naivety or, if you will, a realist, metaphysician, old-fashioned dogmatic philosopher” (F. Longo, & A. Padovano, 2020), substantiates the antithesis of realism and the philosophy of correlation, which involves the traditions of transcendental philosophy, natural philosophy, phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics, partly, psychoanalysis and analytical philosophy, positivism, poststructuralism and postmodernism. It means practically the emergence of a new non-anthropological realism, which with the help of a simple conceptual scheme would dissolve human in a specific depopulated reality, along with his own ideas about reality (Q. Meillassoux calls such a reality in itself as hyper-chaos). Thus, the question is whether it is possible to conceptualize and think a world autonomous from the thinking and semiotic code of language. The liberation of reality from the dictates of human thinking leads to a non-anthropocentric perspective of consideration is, perhaps, the main thesis of speculative realism from G. Harman to Q. Meillassoux and R. Brassier. According to modern researcher T. Morton, the “irreducible openness” of such an approach allows getting rid of “faceless nature” and “immerse yourself more deeply in thinking about things” (Morton, 2011). If being and thinking are fundamentally coherent, and, in thinking, it is impossible to be beyond it to any reality independent of it, and the very factuality of reality is evidenced by thinking (correlationist circle and correlationist factuality), then any way to “break through” to reality outside our concepts is doomed. However, anti-correlationism, as an invariant, offers different ways to get to reality (paraphrasing the famous Wittgenstein’s thesis from the “Logical and Philosophical Treatise”, 4.002), “disguised” by human language and thinking – according to Q. Meillassoux, it is the concept of hyper-chaos; according to G. Harman, it is an object; according to

R. Brassier, it is the concept of transcendental nihilism; according to I. Grant, it is the non-anthropocentric geology of “natural history”. Importantly, in all these variants, anti-correlationism opposes epistemological intersubjectivity as the universal conceptual structure underpinned the human experience and thought by Kant. Anti-correlationism rejects the anthropological criterion and declares the entire previous philosophical tradition to be antirealistic in the sense that it does not raise the question of knowledge about the reality independent from human. It is worth mentioning the concept of the myth of the given by W. Sellars being sacramental for the tradition of analytical philosophy, which is extremely problematic not only the concept of experience and consciousness, but also the space in which all this can exist or can be constituted by these concepts-philosophemes. It is symptomatic that the position of anti-correlationism in Q. Meillassoux’s modification agrees with the classical formulation of the argument (“the Gem”) about the possibility of thinking of an object without accepting the guideline of correlation between then and thinking of the controversial Australian philosopher D. Stove, who denies the possibility of knowing things, as they are in themselves (Franklin, 2002). Thus, the traditions of continental and analytical philosophy (whatever they rely on – on the intentional structures of consciousness or the structure of language as a semiotic code) are entirely dependent on the fundamental principle of correlation. Thus, both the weak version of correlationism, which regulates the epistemological sphere, and the strong version, which absolutizes the correlation between thought and reality, lead to a situation of “fideism”, which consists in skeptical argumentation against the encroachments of metaphysics and rationality in general on access to absolute truth being able to strengthen (and *fortiori* discredit) the value of faith” (Meillassoux, 2013, p. 63). In the context of our topic, it seems important how the philosopher constructs his thinking – first the requirement of the primary absolute is postulated (Meillassoux, 2013, p. 10), and from this, the possibility of further comprehensible statements, i.e., speculation, is derived. From the point of view of philosophical anthropology, such an approach seems to be a modification of the traditional for the 20th century “rebellion against reason”, an attempt to find a way to rehabilitate discredited metaphysics, but not from the standpoint of non-anthropocentrism, “zero degree” of being and personality. Based on the well-known W. Sellars’ distribution of manifest and scientific image of human in the picture of the world (the first is human ideas about the place in the world, which are formed by philosophizing as a transcendental question in Kant’s sense and forming a thesaurus of cultural meanings in the phenomenological dimension; the second is based on the theoretical explanation of what is behind the objective data of things and considers human as a whole within the physical systems of different levels (Sellars, 1991); anti-correlationism denotes the manifest image of man as essentially correlated and anthropocentric, and the return to the norms of scientific realism is associated with the scientific image of human as essentially impersonal. We should note that the liberation of the real from human dictation in such a situation does not mean either liberation from the intentionality of consciousness, or imaginary freedom from discourse and the inclusion of the speaker in the narrative structure of reality. In addition, it should not be forgotten that post-non-classical science, following non-classical science, considers the anthropic principle as an implicit fundamental guideline for scientific description and picture of the world.

In his project of object-oriented ontology (OOO), G. Harman problematizes the anthropocentrism inherent in correlationism, not from the point of view of reality, but from the point of view of considering the concept of object. If everything that exists can be considered as an object and all objects have the same ontological status, then a person doesn’t differ from any other object. However, from the point of view of the strategies of the “undermined object”, “overmined object”, “undermined-overmined object” providing the reductionism of objects within correlationism, which is the subject of criticism by G. Harman, man still seems to

occupy a special place, since it is his interpretation of reality that is performatively and entelechically “made” by objects within the picture of the world. Thus, “undermining” considers objects as an external manifestation of “some deeper force” (G. Harman, 2015, p. 27), i.e., indicates the existence of a certain true reality in the world of things; “overmining” means an attack on an object not from below, but from above: “Objects are important to this extent, in which they are the content of consciousness or a part of some other event, which affects other objects” (G. Harman, 2015, p. 21). That is to say, the object of thought or perception exists for a person only because of its qualities, which are fixed in perception and reflected in the conceptual picture of the world through the connection of object in object-human and object-object systems. “Undermining-overmining”, according to G. Harman, is inherent in the paradigm of materialism, since it, on the one hand, indicates the total integrity behind it, and on the other hand, describes the object, representing it through its qualities. We are primarily interested in the very way of thinking of the philosopher, who latently involves the elimination of “the importance of consciousness for objects” within the consideration (G. Harman, 2015, p. 49). Human consciousness certainly acts as an object, according to G. Harman, but it is such an object that allows thinking of other objects in their own space – paying attention to the spaciousness of Harman’s terms “undermining” and “overmining”, which involves the distinction of “bottom” and “top” and, in general, a certain phenomenism of the discourse of the philosopher. No wonder, from Harman’s point of view, Husserl is the first object-oriented philosopher (Q. Meillassoux, 2013, p. 40). The question is not whether Harman managed to remove the object from the sphere of intentionality and the system of noematic relations, but whether it is possible at all if it is possible to preserve the conditions for thinking and constructing a consistent narrative. According to Harman, if an object for a person clarifies itself in the same way as all its properties, that is, it clarifies itself within the limits of immanent experience, then the intentional content of consciousness and the intentional object are identified. In this case, the question of how the act of consciousness, the idea formed in this act, thought, and cognitive structure of language discourse, which is formed in consciousness and allows to systematize its content, differ, is solved just as much as the original thesis of the philosopher on different ontological status of objects and their qualities allows it. Any object is fundamentally dual: this duality unfolds itself between the object and its many qualities and between the object and its relations. Without going into consideration of the ontology of Harman’s four-pointed object, we note that the main achievement of OOO is the concept of indirect or substitute causality, which should explain the possibility of interaction between objects, and its concept of allure (the object interacts with another object as with unity due to the fact that on their border there are special qualities due to which the interaction takes place on the sensory-intentional level). That is to say, due to these qualities, objects can coexist without touching each other. “As two sensory objects are substitute-connected through the mediation of one real, so two real objects must be substitute-connected through the mediation of one sensor... Adjacency of sensory-perceived objects is impossible without a real intentional agent, and the communication between real objects is carried out only through the mediation of the senses” (G. Harman, 2012, p. 87). As a result, we have a complex spatial geometric structure, similar to the infinitely recursive overlap of Euler’s circles (or spheres), since any object interacts with any other object within a third object. If to remember here that the qualities of the object that are thought, verbalized and enable allure (and resemble the connections of neurons due to synapses) within the discursive fixation of this state of affairs, they must not just be conceptually denoted, but have a remarkable metaphorical potential (in the sense of the possibility of transferring meanings), then OOO as a theory can be considered as a metaphor that involves a performative narrative with zero degree of writing in Bart’s sense and not elimination, but another transfer of

human meanings to the noumenal sphere. Indeed, if we consider the objects of OOO as a certain functional system or discourse of things, which would eliminate all connotations of socio-cultural origin, i.e., all human meanings, and would tend to pure functionality, we would get a de-structured space, since autonomous self-sufficient objects as things overcome structure being so closely intertwined. It can be said, using poststructuralist terminology, that the objects of OOO acquire stages of rhizomatic (J. Deleuze) transparency (J. Baudrillard) within the narrative, forming something similar to Baudrillard's simulacrum of the fourth level as a "short circuit of reference". If to use the cosmological metaphor of the "black hole" as a space of space-time deformation, then concerning OOO, it will mean the collapse of the semantic structure as the linguistic definiteness of things and objects, and, accordingly, discourse. However, the discourse of knowledge exists that problematizes the approach and narrative of G. Harman. O. Golovashina, considering Heidegger's motives in Harman's OOO, points out that Heidegger's discourse is not fundamentally schematic, as it is aimed at "getting rid of the notion of existence in order to come to the essence... Heidegger's quartet is an aid in understanding the world for a person accustomed to the categories of thinking, and Harman's quartet is aimed at embracing the whole world, to fit its diversity in a fairly simple scheme" (O. Golovashina, 2018, p. 8). We emphasize in the context of the purpose of the study that the "metaphysicality" of Harman's constructions is essentially schematic, and this is stipulated by his discursive manner, while Heidegger, owing to his experiments with style and discourse, avoided both an outright schematism, which, by definition, conceptualizes reality, limiting it, and the systemic nature of the finalizing narrative. The course of thought of anti-correlationists in this sense results in "another version of anti-essentialism, a kind of positivism" (O. Golovashina, 2018, p. 8), which is not about the integrity of the world. In our opinion, the role of the integrity of the world in the theoretical constructions of anti-correlationists is assumed by the narrative structure of the texts, which, in some places, acquires more or less formalized features of performativity.

We mean that the space of thought of anti-correlationism is limited both by the initial instruction of negation and by the discursive form of presentation. And that is why the search for a new metaphysics in the case of anti-correlationism in the version of OOO generates a new closed system of judgments and descriptions.

R. Brassier offers his own version of anti-correlationism, which is radical or transcendental nihilism. This version of anti-correlationism most clearly demonstrates the birthmarks of the whole cluster and in relation to the problems of philosophical anthropology and is frankly non-anthropocentric. Such nihilism as a methodological and ideological guideline is positioned as an objective approach to reality, far from anthropocentrically oriented philosophizing such as existentialism, pragmatism, various versions of humanism, and therefore claims the status of the foundation of the scientific picture of the world. Since, according to Brassier, it is impossible to reduce to human meanings the truth of reality external to man, nature and the world are indifferent to man; and there are no thinking higher authorities to which human subjectivity is connected, such nihilism "is an inevitable consequence of realistic conviction that there is a reality independent of consciousness, which, despite the presumption of human narcissism, is indifferent to our existence and indifferent to the "values" and "meanings" we tame to make it more hospitable. Nature is neither ours, nor anyone's else "home", nor especially any charitable ancestor. Philosophers would succeed if they refrained from any further prescriptions about the need to restore the significance of existence, purposefulness of life or to correct the destroyed harmony between human and nature" (Brassier, 2007, p. 11). Thus, the new scientific nihilism appears as a kind of emotional antidote and a reaction of resentment against the disappointment of the collective imagination in the ideals of modern rationality and the cult of the human mind of the Enlightenment project. We should note that such a guideline,

forcing us to recall Epicurus' indifference to the gods, is not new to philosophy or the scientific picture of the world, but is an important part of the performative potential of discourse and the narrative of anti-correlationism since it directly concerns human and is an appeal-proposal to reconfigure his cognitions. If the subject is fundamentally inaccessible to reality, then this reality also cannot be defined conceptually, and therefore, it is the subject of our choice and faith (recall Q. Meillassoux's "fideism"), as well as conceptual construction. R. Brassier denies reality the status of an object: "We know the real through objects, but the real itself is not an object" (Brassier, 2011, p. 50). The philosopher calls his own position "transcendental realism", according to which science knows the real. But the nature of this "real", strictly speaking, cannot be objectified" (Brassier, 2011, p. 50). The modern researcher N. Zahurska writes: "In the speculative reality of the post-anthropocene, the human being himself is objectified, appears as a human object, and it is in this state that he finds out all the diversity of his properties and relations. The human object in this case is a set of objects, which, in turn, are split into a number of objects that is a post-anthropocentric possibility of thought beyond thought as a speculative reality" (2017, p. 8).

Performative Narrative and Anti-Correlationism

In the context of M. Mamardashvili's well-known arguments about the difficulty of keeping oneself in thought (Aesthetics of Thinking, 2000), we note that the apparent antinomy and paradoxicality of the phrase "thought beyond thinking" is, in our opinion, a performative construction and functions as an autosuggestion and invitation to a certain type of philosophizing (e.g., radical physicalism in the philosophy of consciousness, or the practice of the self (M. Foucault), or Lacanian psychoanalysis). It is important that the post-anthropocene, which postulates anti-correlationism, in fact, still remains a radicalized and nihilistic anthropocene at the level of discourse and narrative, as indicated at least by the metaphorical discourses of Meillassoux and Harman. Since metaphorical, "conceptual imagery" forms a structure outside the structure of the narrative, while fixing the pluralism of essentially inaccessible objects and their intersection in the plane of their qualities and properties, which human discursively gathers together in discourse, building a narrative and a picture of the world. For the time being, anti-correlationism postulates thought not outside of thinking, but, using metaphor, on the numerous boundaries of thinking as the facets of a diamond, which has an infinite number of them, and this diamond symbolizes human. We emphasize that only the conceptual structure of the semiotic code of language and the internal structure of discourse and narrative make such a situation possible, and this is not a change in the type of rationality, but only its correction. Findings of modern researchers on the performative contradiction that anti-correlation philosophers fall into when talking about the "zero person" as a way of understanding the essence of things beyond any access to them (Moriceau, 2017), as well as on the controversial nature of OOO for ideological projects and ethics in general (Harmon, 2019), show that the limit of "overmining" and "undermining" of the object is fixed in reality, which is represented in the imagination as pure speculation, pre-verbal and to some extent pre-logical. Another thing is that the referential design and conceptualization of such a reality inevitably returns us to the narrative, is carried out discursively and functions as a performative construction. From an object as an almost immense post-Kantian thing-in-itself and a thing-for-other-things to a concept or category within a conceptual system and discourse, the transition is a simple shift in the focus of discourse, according to Wittgenstein, the language game played by the narrator. Strictly speaking, a classic article by T. Nagel "What is it like to be a bat?" (1974) raises the question of the limits of the ontologization of reality in thought, which are related not so much to the phenomenology of the senses but to verbalization, narrative, and description, i.e., the semiotic code of language. Based on G. Harman, T. Morton proposes his own concept of a hyper-object, the defining

qualities of which are viscosity, non-locality, etc. “Hyper-objects are distributed in time and space in such a way that they are never fully accessible or can be thought of in their entirety” (Morton, 2013, 233 p.), such as: you can perceive the wind or raindrops, but not the weather in general. On the other hand, within the framework of correlationism, in the tradition of cultural hermeneutics, V. Rudnev (“New Model of Reality”, 2016) proposes an epistemological model, which, at the same time, is the basis of a new ontology, which the author defines as narrative. His constructions are based on the ancient author’s thesis on the “opposition of “reality”” moving in time towards entropy, and the text moving in time in the direction of information accumulation”. Thus, the reality of the perceived “object” world is compared with the reality of the plot in its fable and speech dimensions (V. Rudnev, 2016, p. 4). The obvious schematic nature of this model is removed by the intuition that these multidirectional motions have a common tendency to merge, illustrated by the classic “Möbius strip” metaphor, which is a direct appeal to algebraic and geometric topology and demonstrates disjunction, openness, and de-centeredness as defining features of the narrative ontology project. We note the agreement of this understanding of the mode with the existence of objects in G. Harman’s OOO.

The modern linguist argues that guided by pragmatic considerations, the representatives of the development of semantics no longer focus on the study of only the factual function of language, do not rigidly oppose the meaning and logical truth. This is especially true of performative expression (E. Agafonova, 2006), since after analyzing the theory of linguistic act by J. Austin and J. Searle, as well as its critique of poststructuralism in terms of the inherent performative of universalism (due to its iterability – repeatability), the theory of reference abandons rigid distinction textual and non-textual reality, there is a transition “into the performative space of discourse, which opens the paradox of referentiality: a story about what does not yet exist, but which is born only in the process of narration. Narrative discourse not only states about being and not only constructs being, but also constantly produces and reproduces it in the act of narration” (E. Agafonova, 2006, p. 234). Thus, any description and the picture of the world based on it are extremely close to the narrative. Even Wittgenstein’s attempts to construct a grammar of the description of reality that led to the emergence of the theory of the speech act, already latently contained a certain moment of mythologism as a hypostasized narrative. Moreover, these considerations apply both to the humanities and the language of science in general, since a holistic model of description-understanding-experience of the world by human, is based on this understanding of speech, as well as the possibility of forming both autonomous and heteronomous versions of ethics as practical philosophy according to modern researchers (Meretoja, 2014), F. Longo (2020). Naturally, to consider modern fundamental and applied science as a description of the material world without some slip into the oxymoron is hardly possible, since the post-classical paradigm in the fundamental pure and natural sciences necessarily implies not only the existence of an observer but all pragmatic aspects of this existence that find expression in language and speech and can be considered as an element of the narrative. The question now can be put this way: is it possible to consider anything on its own, giving it a predicate of objectivity? Does scientific analysis (from which we necessarily turn to linguistic analysis) presuppose not only the decomposition of being into its components, but also the problems of human, his language, and activity inherent in this analysis? How to deal, in this case, with the manifested anti-correlationism rejection of human meanings and non-anthropocentric instruction? Harman’s “zero person”, like R. Barthes’ “zero writing” at the time, functions as an open concept within the performative as an ontologized narrative. This indicates the internal contradiction of such guidelines that does not preclude its heuristic potential.

At the same time, the non-anthropocentric and anti-metaphysical intentionality of anti-correlationism points to its conceptual affinity with the tradition of anti-essentialism, anti-phonocentrism, and opposition to the philosophy of presence associated with the postmodern philosophical paradigm.

Conclusions. As a result of the consideration of the manifested issue we can formulate the following conclusions:

1. The cluster of anti-correlationism (G. Harman, R. Brassier, Q. Meillassoux, etc.) for the modern philosophy of speculative realism (post-continental philosophy) plays the role of a monolithic guideline and theoretical and ideological basis. The inhomogeneous and amorphous group of thinkers due to the instruction of anti-correlationism, goes beyond the actual ontology and epistemology to ideological (L. Bryant's ontology, Y. Regev's radical secularization) and sociocultural (M. DeLanda) generalizations, significantly influencing the problem field and horizons of meanings of modern philosophy. At the same time, the basic guideline of anti-correlationism seems to be internally antinomic.

2. The guideline of anti-correlationism acts as a representation of the non-anthropocentric tendency in modern philosophizing and is explained as a specific mode of thinking, colliding for the basic model of rationality of post-classical science. The project of creating non-relational non-anthropocentric metaphysics denies the very concept of the correlation between thinking and being and the philosophy of privileged access as being anthropocentric. At the same time, the elements of this new metaphysics are considered to be those that must be accepted by man and form the basis not only of science (R. Brassier) but also of the social religion of renewed humanity (Q. Meillassoux). Thus, anti-correlationism appears as the philosophical basis of transhumanism. Anticorrelationism captures the tendency to absolutize objects (G. Harman), hyper-chaos and stochastics (Q. Meillassoux), transcendental nihilism (R. Brassier), "baselessness" (J. Grant), combining new heuristic cognitive strategies and models and implicit worldview philosophical practices of self, while criticizing the anthropic principle in science, culture and in general the anthropocentrism of science and civilization from the standpoint of eco-philosophy. Such an approach is extremely problematic system of value orientations at the level of civilization.

3. The guideline of anti-correlationism, being formalized and in the process of translation, is based on discursive language practices and the creation of a new ontologized narrative that has the present signs of performativity. The performative now functions as a model of language and speech meaning formation that ontologize the reality of human consciousness, experience and thinking. Thus, the guidelines of anti-correlationism, represented in the texts of the cluster, function in the discourse as a performative programme of narrativization, the construction of a new picture of the world. The paradox of this phenomenon is that the addressee in the semiotic triangle is human consciousness and its formal expression – the subject. The fundamental correlation and the subject cannot be completely eliminated, since it is possible to deny human thinking by means of human language as a universal semiotic code only on the border of rational and immanent (G. Deleuze), intersection of semantic units, using metaphors and symbolism as indications of discursive gaps as points of singularity of thought or text. Therefore, anti-correlationism can be considered within the paradigm of narrative ontology and at the same time performative, action-call, the result of the resentment of the crisis of the 20th century in the collective consciousness and imagination (Ch. Taylor) of mankind.

Conflict of Interest and other Ethics Statements

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

References

- Agafonova, E. (2006). Narrative ontology as an opportunity for a new conceptualization of being. In M. Uvarov (Ed.), *Paradigm: Essays on Philosophy and Theory of Culture*, 6 (232-244). SPb: Publishing

- house of St. Petersburg. un-t. (in Russian).
- Bogost, J. (2012). *Alien Phenomenology, or What It's Like to Be a Thing (Posthumanities)*. University of Minnesota Press.
- Brassier, R. (2007). *Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction*. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Brassier, R. (2011). Concepts and Objects. *The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism*. Melbourne: re.press.
- Bryant, L., Srnicek, N. & Harman, G. (2011). *The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism*. Melbourne: re.press.
- Franklin, J. (2002). Stove's Discovery of the Worst Argument in the World. *Philosophy*, 77(4), 615-624. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819102000487>
- Garman, G. (2018). *Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything*. Pelican Books.
- Golovashina, O. (2018). Objective ontology? Metaphysics of G. Harman. *Bulletin of St. Petersburg State University. Philosophy and conflictology*, 34(1), <https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu17.2018.101>. (in Russian).
- Harman, G. (2012). On substitute causality. *A new literary review*, 2(114), 75-90. (in Russian).
- Harman, G. (2015). *Four-pointed object. Metaphysics of things after Heidegger*. Perm: Gile Press. (in Russian).
- Harman, G. (2020). *Skirmishes: with friends, enemies, and neutrals*. Punctumbooks.
- Harmon, J. (2019). Excessive Materialism and the Metaphysical Basis of an Object-Oriented Ethics. *Philosophy Today*, 63(1), 101-124, https://www.pdcnet.org/philtoday/content/philtoday_2019_0063_0001_0101_0124.
- Kretov, P. & Kretova, O. (2017). Narrative versus object-oriented ontology: concept of thing and performative model of speech. *Bulletin of the Cherkasy Bohdan Khmelnytsky National University. Series philosophy*, 1, 118-127, <http://philosophy-ejournal.cdu.edu.ua/article/view/2045>. (in Russian).
- Kretov, P., & Kretova, O. (2017). Symbolic landscape of consciousness: man between representationalism, functionalism and relativism. *Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research*, 12, 40-49, <https://doi.org/10.15802/ampr.v0i12.119122>. (in Ukrainian).
- Longo, F., Padovano, A., & Umbrello, S. (2020). Value-Oriented and Ethical Technology Engineering in Industry 5.0: A Human-Centric Perspective for the Design of the Factory of the Future. *MDPI*, <https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/10/12/4182>.
- Meillassoux, Q. (2013). Time Without Becoming: Presentation at Middlesex University at the Center for the Study of Contemporary European Philosophy Seminar, hosted by Peter Hallward and Ray Brassier, May 8, 2008. *Hefter. (Gefter)*, https://www.ncca.ru/app/mediatech/file/Quentin_Meillassoux.pdf. (in Russian).
- Meretoja, H. (2014). Narrative and Human Existence: Ontology, Epistemology, and Ethics. *New Literary History*, 45(1), 89-109.
- Moriceau, J.-L. (2017). Object Oriented Ontology's Performativity Paradox: writing from a zeroperson perspective. *CCSD 2017: The 10'h Critical Management Studies Conference. "Time for another revolution?"*. Liverpool, United Kingdom, <https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01570967>.
- Morton, T. (2011). Here Comes Everything: The Promise of Object-Oriented Ontology. *Qui parle spring/summer*, 19(2), 163-190, https://www.academia.edu/934518/Here_Comes_Everything_The_Promise_of_Object_Oriented_Ontology.
- Morton, T. (2013). *Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Rudnev, V. (2016). *New model of reality*. Moscow: HSE. (in Russian).
- Sellars, W. (1991). Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man. In Sellars W. (Ed.), *Science, Perception and Reality*. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1-40.
- Sloterdijk, P., & Turner, C. (2018). *What Happened in the Twentieth Century? : Towards a Critique of Extremist Reason*. Polity Press.
- Starovoit, V. (2018). "Trans-noumenalism" and object-oriented ontology: Real, imaginary and the constitution of objectivity within speculative realism. *Bulletin of V. Karazin Kharkiv National University. Series: "Philosophy. Philosophical Peripetia"*, 58, 46-58. (in Ukrainian).
- Zahurska, N. (2017). Speculative reality of the post-Anthropocene. *"Bulletin of V. Karazin Kharkiv National University. Series: "Philosophy. Philosophical Peripetia"*, 57, 4-8. (in Russian).

Павло КРЕТОВ, Олена КРЕТОВА

КЛАСТЕР АНТИКОРЕЛЯЦІОНІЗМУ ТА ПЕРФОРМАТИВНИЙ НАРАТИВ

Анотація. Метою дослідження є з'ясування визначальних тенденцій антикореляціонізму та його наративних стратегій як фундаментальної підстави спекулятивного реалізму, а також розгляд однієї з його версій – об'єктно-орієнтованої онтології у співвідношенні

з концепцією наративної онтології та поняттям перформативу як антропологічного маркера дискурсу під кутом зору осмислення проблематики філософської антропології. Автори виходять з парадоксального характеру настанови антикореляціонізму, яка обґрунтовує нереляційну метафізику, водночас постулюючи побудову наративної онтології реальності, яка має ознаки перформативу. Вперше співставлено антропологічний зміст визначальних тенденцій антикореляціонізму та його наративних стратегій як фундаментальної підстави спекулятивного реалізму та об'єктно-орієнтованої онтології з концепцією наративної онтології та поняттям перформативу як антропологічного маркера дискурсу. З'ясовано, що дискурсивна критика кореляціонізму внутрішньо суперечлива, оскільки апелює до мислення і свідомості суб'єкта та твореного ним наративу як картини світу. Перформатив наразі функціонує як модель мовного та мовленнєвого смислотворення які онтологізують реальність людських свідомості, досвіду та мислення.

У результаті розгляду виявленого питання можна сформулювати наступні висновки: 1. Кластер антикореляціонізму для сучасної філософії спекулятивного реалізму відіграє роль монолітного орієнтиру та теоретико-ідеологічної основи. Неоднорідна й аморфна група мислителів через настанову антикореляціонізму виходить за межі власне онтології та епістемології до ідеологічного та соціокультурного узагальнення, що істотно впливають на проблемне поле та горизонти сенсу сучасної філософії. 2. Настанова антикореляціонізму виступає як репрезентація неантропоцентричної тенденції в сучасному філософствуванні і пояснюється як специфічний спосіб мислення, що стикається з базовою моделлю раціональності посткласичної науки. 3. Орієнтир антикореляціонізму є формалізованим і перебуває в процесі перекладу, ґрунтується на дискурсивних мовних практиках і створенні нового онтологізованого наративу, що має наявні ознаки перформативності. Перформатив тепер функціонує як модель формування мовного та мовленнєвого значення, що онтологізує реальність людської свідомості, досвіду та мислення. Таким чином, настанови антикореляціонізму, репрезентовані в текстах кластера, функціонують у дискурсі як перформативна програма наративізації, побудови нової картини світу. Парадоксальність цього явища полягає в тому, що адресатом в семіотичному трикутнику є свідомість людини, а його формальним виразом – суб'єкт.

Ключові слова: антикореляціонізм, наратив, перформатив, спекулятивний реалізм, наративна онтологія

Submitted: 20.05.2021

Revised: 26.08.2021

Accepted: 12.09.2021